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IMMIGRATION LAW

BUTROS v. INS: THE FOLLY OF FINALITY
AS AN ABSOLUTE BAR TO SEEKING
§ 212(c) RELIEF FROM DEPORTATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Butros v. INS,l the Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane, held
that an alien who has established lawful permanent resident
(hereinafter "LPR") status in the United States may seek discretionary relief'l from deportation so long as his case may be
appealed to the Ninth Circuit, or reopened or reconsidered by
the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA" or "Board," hereinafter used interchangeably).3 In effect, this ruling does not recognize the finality of a deportation order until the alien physically
1. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993) (per Noonan, J.; Fernandez, Beezer, Hall, JJ., concurring; Trott, Brunetti, JJ., dissenting).
2. Discretionary relief from an order of deportation may be granted at the discretion
of the Attorney General. It may be sought pursuant to § 212(c) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act [hereinafter, "INA"]. Section 212(c) is codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)
(1988). It provides in pertinent part:
Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of
deportation, and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished
domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in the
discretion of the Attorney General . . . .
The statute was specifically designed to afford relief to aliens in exclusion, and not deportation, proceedings. Case law has extended its application to deportation proceedings.
See, e.g., Tapia-Acuna v. INS, 640 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1981); Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268
(2d Cir. 1976); Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581 (1978); see infra notes 56-66 and
accompanying text discussing the evolution of § 212(c) to encompass deportation
proceedings.
3. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1144-46. Motions to reopen or reconsider are governed by
BIA regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1992); see infra note 26 for the text of the governing
regulation.
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leaves the United States! The Ninth Circuit's ruling allows
aliens to seek relief not only from deportation orders issued by
an immigration judge but, more importantly, from deportation
orders which are "administratively final",5 The Ninth Circuit's
ruling is, however, limited to those aliens who have already
maintained LPR status for seven years,6
Prior to Butros, the Ninth Circuit, in Gonzales v, INS,7
barred such discretionary relief under the rationale that (1) the
BIA's initial denial of relief rendered the deportation order administratively final; (2) that an administratively final deportation order terminated the lawfulness of the alien's domicile in
the United States by divesting the alien's LPR status; and (3)
that § 212(c) requires an alien to maintain present LPR status,B
Butros overruled Gonzales,9 The Ninth Circuit explained
that the fallacy of Gonzales was the belief that what is final for
certain administrative purposes is final for all purposes,lO The
Butros court reasoned that so long as the BIA could reopen or
reconsider an administratively final decision on its own motion,
an alien's motion could not be summarily denied under the pretense that the deportation order had been finalized,ll

Although the result is fair on the Butros facts,12 the Ninth
4. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2. ("A motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be
made by or in behalf of a person who is the subject of deportation proceedings subsequent to his departure from the United States. Any departure from the United States of
a person who is the subject of deportation proceeding after the making of a motion to
reopen or a motion to reconsider shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion."); see
infra note 26 for the full text of this regulation.
5. An immigration judge's deportation order becomes administratively final when
affirmed by the BIA. See Matter of Lok, 18 I. & N. Dec. 101, 105 (1981).
6. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1146 (declining to decide whether the Butros rule would be
applied to aliens who had not maintained LPR status for seven years).
Section 212(c) requires that an alien have established a seven-year lawful domicile
to be eligible for discretionary relief. The Ninth Circuit recognizes a seven-year lawful
domicile only if the alien possessed LPR status for the seven years. See, e.g., CastilloFelix v. INS, 601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979).
7. 921 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1990).
8. See id. at 238-41.
9. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1145.
10. ld.
11. ld.
12. Evidence suggests that Butros' inability to receive discretionary relief at the initial hearing resulted through his original lawyer's incompetence. See infra note 25
presenting such evidence. .
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Circuit's new rule is problematic. By delaying the point at which
a deportation order is deemed final and limiting their holding to
aliens with seven or more years of LPR status, the Ninth Circuit
has created the potential for unintelligible distinctions and incongruous results. 13 The ruling has also added another branch to
the multi-faceted circuit split created by inconsistent judicial interpretation of § 212(c).14
Through an analysis of the chain of reasoning that led the
court to the Butros decision, this article will demonstrate how
abolishing the requirement that aliens possess present LPR status would have achieved the same fair result without fostering
the circuit split or spurring on unintended, unwanted results.
The suggested approach differs from the Ninth Circuit's rule in
two significant ways. First it would change an alien's status from
LPR to non-LPR upon an administratively final deportation order. Second, and more importantly, it would not absolutely bar
non-LPR aliens from simply seeking § 212(c) relief. III
II.

FACTS
Nairn Butros entered the United States in February 1975 as

Although the Ninth Circuit allowed Butros the opportunity to seek discretionary
relief, Butros would then have the heavy burden of convincing the BIA that his motion
to reopen and reconsider should be granted. See Matter of Coelho, Int. Dec. 3172 (BIA,
Apr 30, 1992). If the motion were granted, Butros would then have to convince an immigration judge that he actually deserved discretionary relief. Whether Butros ultimately
receives relief is immaterial. What is important is that he was given the opportunity to
make his arguments and that the ultimate decision will be based upon the merits of his
case and not upon procedural technicaliti~s.
13. See infra notes 244-49 and accompanying text discussing the potential problems
created by the Butros rule.
14. See infra notes 250-60 and accompanying text describing the present state of
the law in various circuits.
Through Butros, the Ninth Circuit has offered yet another interpretation of perhaps
the most ambiguous statutory provision in the INA. See infra notes 73-108 and accompanying text for the varying interpretations regarding (1) the commencement of an
alien's lawful domicile for purposes of § 212(c) relief, (2) the termination of such lawful
domicile, and (3) motions to reopen or reconsider the denial of § 212(c) relief.
15. Tying § 212(c) eligibility to an administratively final deportation order is a requirement absent in the language and legislative history of § 212(c). The requirement
was created in Gonzales through a misunderstanding of a prior BIA case (Matter of Lok
11). See infra notes 198-216 and accompanying text discussing the misunderstanding.
This misunderstanding was compensated for rather than corrected in Butros. See infra
notes 221-38 and accompanying text discussing the Butros court's approach in overruling
Gonzales.
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an LPR.I8 He was six years old at the timeY In 1987, he was
convicted of a drug offense in Oregon. I8 This conviction rendered Butros deportable under § 241(a)(11) of the INA.I9 The
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") subsequently
moved to deport him.20 At the time, Butros' family resided in
the United States. 21 Butros conceded deportability but moved
for relief under § 212(c) of the INA.22 In 1988, the immigration
judge denied relief and entered a deportation order.23
Butros immediately filed an appeal to the BIA.24 The BIA
summarily dismissed the appeal because Butros failed to specify
the reasons for his appeal. 25
16. See Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 1993).
17. See [d. at 1142.
18. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1143. In 1986, Butros was involved in a motorcycle accidept which resulted in a broken arm, a broken jaw and the loss of four teeth. Petitioner's
Brief at 4, Butros (No. 91-70372) (hereinafter, "P.B."). At least two treating physicians
independently prescribed Percodan for the pain. [d. Percodan is known to cause dependency. After the prescriptions ceased, Butros began using cocaine, an illegal drug similar
in nature and effect to Percodan. [d. Butros claimed to have sold cocaine solely to supply
his lawfully acquired habit of taking Percodan. Respondent's Brief at 8, Butros (No. 9170372) (hereinafter "R.B.").
19. Codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1988) amended by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. II 1990).
20. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1143.
21. His mother, father, and sister also resided in the United States as LPRs. R.B. at
5-6. His three brothers were naturalized citizens. [d.
22. See supra note 2 for the text of § 212(c). This provision has been extended to
cover aliens who have not left the country. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976);
see infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text discussing the Francis court's rationale.
23. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1143. The Immigration Judge was prepared to make a
favorable ruling until the INS presented its case in rebuttal. [d. at 1147. Butros' nondisclosure of a subsequent arrest for selling cocaine was found to be representative of his
lack of rehabilitation. [d. Furthermore, the Judge was distressed by the statement, "You
didn't do anything before, why do you think you can do anything now?" which Butros
had made to an official following the second arrest. [d.
24. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1147. The BIA reviews administrative rulings of immigration judges. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1992).
25. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1147. The BIA acted in accordance with 8 C.F.R.
§ 3.1(d)(1-a)(i) (allowing the BIA to summarily dismiss any appeal in any case when the
alien fails to specify the reasons for appeal). Butros later accredited the omission to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1143.
Following the BIA's dismissal Butros hired a new lawyer. [d. at 1147. The new counsel filed a complaint against prior counsel with the Oregon State Bar. See Butros v. INS,
804 F. Supp. 1336, 1338 (D. Or. 1991). The complaint alleged that prior counsel "failed
to clarify a crucial error, failed to call favorable witnesses, failed to prepare petitioner
adequately and failed to understand the law." [d.
Butros also applied to the district director for a stay of deportation which was denied shortly thereafter. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1143.
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Butros then filed a "Motion to Reopen and Reconsider"26
with the BIA.27 He claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and
offered new evidence. 28
The BIA refused to reopen or reconsider Butros' case because the deportation order "became administratively final at
26. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2. The regulation provides:
The Board may on its own motion reopen or reconsider
any case in which it has rendered a decision. Reopening or
reconsideration of any case in which a decision has been made
by the Board, whether requested by the Commissioner or any
other duly authorized officer of the Service, or by the party
affected by the decision, shall be only upon written motion to
the Board. Motions to reopen in deportation proceedings shall
not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence
sought to be offered is material and was not available and
could not have been discovered or presented at the former
hearing; nor shall any motion to reopen for the purpose of affording the alien an opportunity to apply for any form of discretionary relief be granted if it appears that the alien's right
to apply for such relief was fully explained to him and an opportunity to apply therefor was afforded him at the former
hearing unless the relief is sought on the basis of circumstances which have arisen subsequent to the hearing. A motion
to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made by or in
behalf of a person who is the subject of deportation proceedings subsequent to his departure from the United States.
Any departure from the United States of a person who is the
subject of deportation proceedings occurring after the making of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion. For the purpose of this
section, any final decision made by the Commissioner prior to
the effective date of the Act with respect to any case within
the classes of cases enumerated in § 3.l(b)(I), (2), (3), (4), or
(5) shall be regarded as a decision of the Board.
[d. (emphasis added).
27. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1143.
28. [d.
Butros also asked the BIA for a stay of deportation. [d. Without the stay of deportation, Butros would have been physically deported from the United States before the BIA
ruled on the motion to reopen and reconsider. Consequently, any motion to reopen or
reconsider on Butros' behalf would have been considered withdrawn. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2;
see supra note 26 for the text of the regulation. The BIA denied the stay. See Butros,
990 F.2d at 1143.
Butros then filed a petition of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for
the District of Oregon. [d. The District Court reversed the BINs decision and granted
the stay of deportation. [d. The District Court observed that Butros' claim was "not
frivolous." [d. The denial of the stay effectively foreclosed "petitioner's right under 8
C.F.R. §§ 3.2, 3.8 to move to reopen this case." [d. The District Court concluded that
the denial of the stay was an abuse of discretion. [d.
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the time of [the summary dismissal of the initial appeal]."29 The
BIA reasoned that at the time of administrative finality, Butros
was divested of his LPR status and, therefore, became statutorily ineligible for § 212(c) relief. so The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, sitting en bane, granted review. S1
III. BACKGROUND
The primary issue in Butros v. INss2 was whether the BIA
correctly denied Butros' "Motion to Reopen and Reconsider"
based solely on its conclusion that he was statutorily ineligible
for § 212(c) relief. Logically, the Ninth Circuit had to analyze
whether Butros was statutorily eligible for § 212(c) relief in order to determine whether the BIA was correct in denying Butros' motion to reopen and reconsider.
Section 212(c), as written, applies only to aliens returning
from a temporary departure who are in exclusion proceedings. ss
Case law has extended its application to aliens, such as Butros,
who have not temporarily,proceeded abroad and are the subjects
of deportation proceedings. s• Unfortunately, confusion has accompanied this extension as the various circuits have disagreed
on the application of § 212(c) to deportation proceedings. slI
A.

HISTORY OF §

1.

The Exclusion-Deportation Distinction and the Need for
Discretionary Relief

212(c)

Deportation applies to aliens s8 who have made an entry S'7
29. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1143.
30. Id. Implicitly, the BIA required an alien to maintain LPR status when applying
for § 212(c) relief.
31. Butros v. INS, 977 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1992).
32. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993).
33. See supra note 2 for the text of the statute.
34. See infra notes 56-66 and accompanying text discussing the extension of
§ 212(c) relief to deportation proceedings.
35. See infra notes 73-108 and accompanying text discussing the various constructions of § 212(c).
36. The term "alien" describes any person not a citizen or national of the United
States. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). The term "national" describes a person owing permanent
allegiance to a state. Id, § 1101(a)(21).
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into the United States, whereas exclusion applies to aliens attempting to enter the United States. 3S In general, the rules of
exclusion are much stricter than the rules of deportation. 39
There were nineteen grounds of deportation 40 as compared to
thirty-four grounds of exclusion41 prior to the Immigration Act
of 1990.42 Therefore, aliens could commit excludable offenses yet
37. The term "entry" is defined as "any coming of an alien into the United States,
from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession, whether voluntarily or otherwise ... [pJrovided, that no person whose departure from the United States was occasioned by deportation proceedings, extradition, or other legal process shall be held to be
entitled to such exception." 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(13).
38. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25 (1982) ("The deportation hearing is the
usual means of proceeding against an alien already physically in the United States, and
the exclusion hearing is the usual means of proceeding against an alien outside the
United States seeking admission.").
39. Compare 8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (1988) (the exclusion grounds) with 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)
(1988) (the deportation grounds). The underlying rationale is that a person in the United
States should be given every chance to stay, while an outsider should face heightened
scrutiny before being allowed in.
40. These include, inter alia, aliens who were excludable at entry, entered without
inspection, have become institutionalized at public expense, have been convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude, currently advocate anarchy or communism, have engaged or had purpose to engage in espionage, sll-botage or activities subversive to the
national interest, are drug addicts or have been convicted of a violation of any law relating to a controlled substance, or have been convicted of possessing illegal firearms, notably the sawed-off shotgun. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (11) and (14)
(1988).
41. These include, inter alia, aliens who are mentally retarded, are insane, are sexual deviants, mentally defective or have psychopathic personalities, are drug addicts or
alcoholics, are afflicted with a dangerous contagious disease, have been convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude, have been convicted of two or more crimes involving
actual sentences of at least five years in the aggregate, have been convicted of a crime
relating to a controlled substance or are suspected of involvement with the trafficking of
controlled substances, are likely to become public charges, have been previously deported, intentionally, negligently, or fraudulently failed to comply with documentary entry requirements, are or have been anarchists or communists, have assisted in the illegal
entry of another alien into the United States, or are graduates of a foreign non-accredited medical school and who enter with the intention of practicing medicine. 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1182(a)(1), (2), (4)-(6), (9), (10), (23), (15), (17), (19)-(21), (28), (31), and (32).
42. The Immigration Act of 1990 ("IA 90") completely reorganized the grounds for
deportation. See Janet H. Cheetham, Deportation Grounds Under the Immigration Act
of 1990, IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS, NO. 91-11 November 1991. The nineteen distinct
grounds were grouped into five categories: (1) Excludable at Time of Entry or of Adjustment of Status or Violates Status; (2) Criminal Offenses; (3) Failure to Register and
Falsification of Documents; (4) Security and Related Grounds; and (5) Public Charge. 8
U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(1)-(5) (Supp. IV 1992). Each category except the fifth is comprised of
several grounds. A few of the old deportation grounds were abolished, including those
which applied when an alien became institutionalized, involved with prostitution, was
convicted of a violation of title I of the Alien Registration Act, 1940. 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1251(a)(3), (12), (15), and (16) (1988). Several new deportation grounds were established, including those which apply when an alien is involved in terrorist activities, un-
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not be deportable. 43

In such a scenario, so long as the alien remained within the
United States, no action could be brought against him. Once the
alien departs the country and attempts to re-enter, however, the
grounds for exclusion would govern h.is admissibility. Since the
alien had committed an excludable offense, the alien's re-entry
would be barred. 44
The harshness of this anomaly can be illustrated by a hypothetical example of an LPR41! who contracted a communicable
disease 46 while in the United States and traveled abroad for
lawful technology or information transfer, money laundering, or when the Secretary of
State has reasonable grounds to believe that the alien's presence or activities in the
United States would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences. 8
U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(4)(B), (4)(A)(i), (2)(A)(iii), (4)(C) (Supp. IV 1992).
IA 90 completely reorganized the grounds of exclusion, as well. See Daniel Levy,
Exclusion Grounds Under the Immigration Act of 1990: Part I, IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS,
NO. 91-8 August 1991; Exclusion Grounds Under the Immigration Act of 1990: Part II,
IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS, NO. 91-9 September 1991. There are currently nine categories of
exclusion grounds: (1) health-related grounds; (2) crime-related grounds; (3) national security grounds; (4) public charge; (5) labor protection grounds; (6) prior immigration
violations; (7) documentation requirements; (8) grounds relating to military service in
the United States; and (9) miscellaneous grounds. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(1}-(9) (Supp. IV
1992). Each category except the fourth is comprised of several grounds. IA 90 abolished
the exclusion grounds based upon mental retardation; physical defects which might impede the aliens ability to earn a living; paupers, professional beggars, or vagrants; immoral sexual activity; and illiterate aliens over the age of 16. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(1), (7),
(8), (13) and (25) (1988). IA 90 added, inter alia, the exclusion grounds for drug abusers;
export control violators; terrorists or PLO members; admissions which would pose serious foreign policy risks; participants in genocide; and international child abductors. 8
U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii), (3)(A)(i), (3)(B), (3)(C), (3)(E)(ii) and (9)(C) (Supp. IV
1992).
43. Interestingly, the grounds for exclusion and deportation overlap with respect to
criminal offenses, public charges, documentary grounds and security reasons. However,
there are distinct grounds for exclusion with respect to, inter alia, health-related and
labor protection areas. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(1) and (5) (Supp. IV 1992).
44. A judicially-created exception, known as the Fleuti Doctrine, does apply if the
departure was "innocent, casual, and brief." Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462
(1963); see Landon, 459 U.S. at 28-29; Git Foo Wong v. INS, 358 F.2d 151, 153 (9th Cir.
1966). In Fleuti, the alien, who was homosexual, went to Ensenada, Mexico for "about a
couple of hours." Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 450. Homosexuality was not a deportable offense
but was aq excludable offense. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1988). The INS sought to later
deport Fleuti as excludable at time of entry. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 450-51. The court sympathized with Fleuti and did not classify his admission back into the U.S. as an "entry"
within the definition of 8 U.s.C. § 1101(a)(13). Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 461-63.
45. An LPR falls within the definition of "alien." See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).
46. Carrying a communicable disease is an excludable offense. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6).
However, it is not a deportable offense.
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treatment. Though he would not be deported while he remained
in the country, following his departure he would be denied reentry based on his status as an excludable alien. Congress initially attempted to alleviate this problem through the "seventh
proviso" of the Immigration Act of 1917,47 and, subsequently,
through § 212(c) of the INA.48
2.

The Seventh Proviso: Statutory Precursor to Section 212(c)

Prior to 1952, the "seventh proviso" of the Immigration Act
of 191749 afforded relief to aliens in a predicament such as that
of the hypothetical excludable alien. 5O It provided that "aliens
returning after a temporary absence to an unrelinquished
United States domicile of seven consecutive years may be admitted in the discretion of the Secretary of Labor and under such
conditions as he may prescribe."111 An alien who had maintained
the required seven-year domicile could thereby be allowed to
seek a waiver from exclusion. Thus, in the above example of the
alien with the communicable disease, so long as he had been
domiciled in the United States for seven consecutive years prior
to his brief departure, he could qualify for discretionary
admission.
The seventh proviso was criticized, however, because it did
not require the original entry to be lawfully made,1I2 nor did it
47. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 875 (repealed 1952).
48. It is interesting to note that because the rationale behind enacting § 212(c) was
to offer relief from excludable offenses, the statute was not designed to afford relief to
aliens, such as Butros, in deportation proceedings.
49. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 875 (repealed 1952).
50. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text presenting the hypothetical.
51. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 875 (repealed 1952).
52. See S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1950). The report contained the
following language,
It appears that when the seventh proviso was made a part
of the 1917 act the proviso was intended to give discretionary
power to the proper government official to grant relief to
aliens who were reentering the United States after a temporary absence, who came in the front door, were inspected, lawfully admitted, established homes here and remained for 7
years before they got into trouble.
[d. at 382. The report also stated that "[t]he subcommittee recommends that the proviso
would be limited to aliens who have the status of lawful permanent residents who are
returning to a lawful domicile of seven consecutive years after a temporary absence
abroad." [d. at 384.
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preclude nonimmigrants li3 from qualifying. 1i4 Congress addressed
this criticism by incorporating a requirement that the alien have
been "lawfully admitted for permanent residence." In 1952, this
modified version of the seventh proviso was enacted as § 212(c)
of the INA.1i1i
3.

The Expansion of Section 212(c) to Afford Relief From
Deportation

At its inception, § 212(c) relief was invoked only when an
excludable alien physically departed the country and later returned. lis In 1976, the Second Circuit's landmark decision in
Francis v. INSli7 vastly expanded the scope of § 212(c). In Francis, the alien did not depart the United States following his conviction of a marijuana offense. lis The INS charged him with being deportable under § 241(a)(1l).1i9 Francis satisfied all
§ 212(c) requirements but for his absence to depart the
country.so
The Second Circuit, applying the minimum scrutiny test,S1
53. The nonimmigrant classes are listed in the INA. They include, inter alia, ambassadors, their staff and family, business visitors and tourists, students, and foreign
media along with their spouses and children. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(A), (B), (F) and (I).
54. See S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1952).
55. See supra note 2 for the text of § 212(c).
56. In 1956, it was extended to aliens who had already reentered, under the rationale that aliens who, if requested, could have asserted 212(c) at the time of reentry,
should not be precluded from doing so simply because the excludable offense escaped
detection until after admission. See Matter of G.A., 7 I. & N. Dec. 274, 276 (1956) (relying in part upon Matter of L., 1 I & N. Dec. 1 (1940». In Matter of L., the Attorney
General accorded seventh proviso relief nunc pro tunc to an alien in deportation proceedings because the alien had departed the United States in the past and would have
qualified at the time of last entry had he been excluded for his offense. Matter of L., 1 I.
& N. Dec. at 6.
57. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
58. Francis, 532 F.2d at 269.
59. [d. This ground of deportation parallels the ground of exclusion for possession of
narcotic drugs. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(23).
60. See Francis, 532 F.2d at 272. Had Francis departed the United States and
sought re-entry, he would have been able to seek a waiver of the exclusion charge under
§ 212(c).
61. This is an equal protection test under which "distinctions between different
classes of persons 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.''' [d. at 272 (citing Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975); Royster Guano Co. ~. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920».
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failed to discern a distinction between the class of aliens who
had departed the United States following their deportable offense and the class of aliens who failed to depart. s2 The requirement that aliens be "returning after a temporary absence" was
therefore eliminated as violative of the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment. ss The BIA voluntarily adopted the
Francis rule. s " The Ninth Circuit, although initially reluctant,SII
eventually followed the Francis rule. ss

B.

ApPLICATION OF SECTION 212(c) IN DEPORTATION CASES

As originally drafted, § 212(c) relief would not have been
available to the alien in Butros v. INS.s7 Section 212(c) explicitly requiI:es the alien to: first, be lawfully admitted for permanent residence;s8 second, have temporarily proceeded abroad
voluntarily and not under an order of deportation;s9 and third,
62. Francis, 532 F.2d at 272, 273 ("Reason and fairness would suggest that an alien
whose ties with this country are so strong that he has never departed after his initial
entry should receive at least as much consideration as an individual who may leave and
return from time to time.").
63. Id. at 272-73. Courts have limited § 212(c) to only those grounds of deportation
under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) which paralleled enumerated grounds of exclusion under 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a). See Cabasug v. INS, 847 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1988).
64. See Matter of Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 29-30 (1976); Matter of Hom, 16 I. & N.
Dec. 112, 113-14 (1977); Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 582 (1978).
65. Prior to Francis, the Ninth Circuit had addressed § 212(c) and concluded that
the alien must depart and re-enter the United States to qualify for the discretionary
relief. Arias-Uribe v. INS, 466 F.2d 1198, 1199-200 (9th Cir. 1972). Following Francis, the
Ninth Circuit continued to require physical departure without addressing the conflict
between the two doctrines. See Castillo-Felix v. INS, 601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979);
Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1979); Bowe v. INS, 597 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir .
. 1979); see generally, Bill Ong Hing, The Ninth Circuit: No Place for Drug Offenders, 10
GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 1 (1980) (advocating the Francis approach in the Ninth Circuit).
66. See Tapia-Acuna v. INS,640 F.2d 223, 224-25, (9th Cir. 1981) (observing the
Second Circuit's implicit extension of § 212(c) to only those grounds of deportation
which would render the alien excludable). In cases where an alien's actions constitute
grounds for deportation, but not exclusion, the Ninth Circuit has denied § 212(c) relief.
See Cabasug v. INS, 847 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1988) (alien convicted of carrying a sawedoff shotgun, hence deportable under § 241(a)(14), denied § 212(c) relief as the conviction would not render the alien excludable). The rationale for this distinction stems from
judicial interpretation of Congressional intent that "[§ 212(c)] relief applies only to
[§ 212], the exclusion statute." Cabasug, 847 F.2d at 1326.
67. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993).
68. "Lawfully admitted for permanent residence" is defined as "the status of having
been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an
immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed." 8
U.S.C. § 1101(20) (1988).
69. This requirement has been abrogated by case law. See supra notes 56-66 and
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be returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years. 70 As the statute was extended to cover aliens in
deportation proceedings, administrative and judicial construction of § 212(c) diverged on such issues as when the alien's lawful domicile commences and terminates.71 Courts also divided as
to whether the termination of lawful domicile renders the alien
ineligible to move to reopen or reconsider the denial of § 212(c)
relief. 72
1.

Terminating Lawful Domicile Under Section 212(c)

At issue in Butros u. INS7s was the termination of lawful
domicile. 74 The BIA and the various circuits have adopted difaccompanying text discussing its abolition.
70. See supra note 2 for the text of § 212(c). Technically, § 212(c) does not require
a showing of rehabilitation or extreme hardship. However, since relief is discretionary, an
immigration judge may evaluate both factors before rendering a decision. See Matter of
Marin, 16 1. & N. Dec. 581 (1978). An immigration judge may also require a showing of
good moral character. See Matter of N., 7 I. & N. Dec. 368 (1956).
71. See infra notes 73-90 and accompanying text discussing the different views with
respect to termination of lawful domicile.
72. See infra notes 91-108 and accompanying text discussing the different views
with respect to motions to reopen or reconsider the denial of § 212(c) relief.
73. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993).
74. Id. at 1144-46. The Ninth Circuit had to decide whether the administratively
final deportation order terminated Butros' LPR status and, concurrently, his lawful
domicile, because the Ninth Circuit had required present LPR status as a prerequisite to
§ 212(c) eligibility. Id.; see Gonzales v. INS, 921 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1990).
Although the commencement of lawful domicile was not at issue in Butros u. INS,
variations in its interpretation reflect the confusion caused by judicial extension of
§ 212(c) to deportation proceedings. Determining when lawful domicile commences
hinges upon whether the clause "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" is read to
modify the clause "lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years" or is read
independently from it. See supra note 2 for the text of § 212(c).
The BIA and various circuits do not consistently interpret the statutory language in
determining when lawful domicile commences. See, e.g. Matter of Lok, 15 1. & N. Dec.
720 (1976) (mandating that an alien establish the seven-year lawful unrelinquished domicile after having been lawfully admitted for permanent residence, thereby nullifying the
accrual of time toward the 7-year requirement that an alien lawfully spent in the United
States prior to obtaining LPR status); Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1977) (overruling the BIA's interpretation in Matter of Lok and opting instead to further "the obvious purpose of the statute [which was] to mitigate the hardship that deportation poses
for those with family ties in this country" by counting the time an alien resides in the
United States, prior to obtaining LPR status, toward the seven-year requirement so long
as the alien has legally resided in the country); Castillo-Felix v. INS, 601 F.2d 459, 465
(9th Cir. 1979) (disagreeing with the Second Circuit's conclusion tha.t the BIA's interpretation of § 212(c) was inconsistent with congressional policy as well as its statutory intent, and recognizing that because it was called upon to interpret "an ambiguous provision with little legislative history to clarify how Congress intended it to be applied," it
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ferent approaches in determining when lawful domicile terminates. 71i The BIA, in Matter of Lok,76 (hereinafter "Matter of
Lok JI")77 ruled that once an alien is found deportable with administrative finality, that alien can no longer be considered
"lawfully admitted for permanent residence."78 The BIA considwas appropriate to defer to the administrative agency in charge); Chiravacharadhikul v.
INS, 645 F.2d 248, 250 (4th Cir. 1981) (following the 9th Circuit's approach in deferring
to the BIA); Anwo v. INS, 607 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (adopting a two-part test for
determining when lawful domicile begins: 1- focusing on whether the alien intended to
permanently remain in the United States; and 2- analyzing whether such an intent was
legal under U.S. laws).
75. Recall, Butros overruled Gonzales on the issue of when lawful domicile for purposes of § 212(c) terminates. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1145.
76. 18 1. & N. Dec. 101 (1981).
77. Tim Lok's ordeal through the administrative and judicial court systems resulted
in two notable BIA decisions and two notable Second Circuit decisions. Matter of Lok,
15 1. & N. Dec. 720 (1976) [hereinafter "Matter of Lok I"]; Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37 (2d
Cir. 1977) [hereinafter "Tim Lok I"]; Matter of Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. 101 (1981); Lok v.
INS, 681 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1982) [hereinafter "Tim Lok n"].
78. Matter of Lok II, 18 1. & N. Dec. at 105.
That deportation changes an alien's status to one not "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" is not supported by statutory language nor any legislative history. The
legislative history is silent as to which changes in status remove the alien from this classification. Any analysis of § 212(c)'s legislative history, for purposes of deportation proceedings, should be strictly scrutinized because this statute was designed to accord relief
in exclusion proceedings. Administrative and case law have extended its application to
deportation. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text discussing the extension.
In Matter of S., 6 1. & N. Dec. 392 (1954), approved by Attorney General, 6 1.& N.
Dec. at 397 (1955), the BIA examined the legislative purpose of § 212(c) and its precursor, the seventh proviso. The BIA reasoned that the inclusion of the "lawfully admitted
for permanent residence" requirement was geared toward a concern for nonimmigrants
qualifying for discretionary relief. Id. at 396-97; see supra note 68 for the definition of
"lawfully admitted for permanent residence." The BIA recognized that "language can
have different meanings in the same act, and there is no rule of statutory construction
which precludes the courts from giving to the word the meaning which the legislature
intended it should have in each instance." Id. at 396. The BIA concluded:
There is specific provision in section 247 whereby certain
resident aliens may have their status adjusted to nonimmigrant status. And it is logical to assume that the Congress,
having expressed a serious disapproval of the practice whereby
7th Proviso relief was accorded to aliens who had been admitted to the United States in a nonimmigrant status, wished to
make it clear that not only was this type of relief not to be
granted to aliens unless lawfully admitted as immigrants, but
to emphasize that it was also not to be granted to aliens who
thereafter changed their status from that of immigrants to
nonimmigrants. It is our conclusion that in order to give effect
to the overall legislative design, this is the meaning which
must be given to the term "such status not having changed."
Id. at 396-97 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20» (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit, as
well as the United States Supreme Court, have affirmed this interpretation of the stat-
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ered four stages within the deportation process at which point
the alien could be deemed to have lost the determinative status:
(1) upon the immigration judge's initial determination of deportability, (2) when the immigration
judge's order becomes administratively final, (3)
when a United States Court of Appeals acts upon
a petition for review of the Board's order or the
time allowed for filing such petition expires, or (4)
only upon the execution of the deportation order
by the alien's departure, voluntary or enforced,
from this country.79

The BIA opted to terminate the alien's lawful domicile at
the second stage-upon administrative finality of the deportation order, i.e., when the BIA affirms the immigration judge's
decision. so
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have concurred with the
BIA's approach. 81 The Second Circuit generally agrees with the
ute. Gooch v. Clark, 433 F.2d 74, 79 (1970) ("[The phrase 'such status not having
changed'] refers primarily to aliens who have changed their status from immigrants to
nonimmigrants."); Saxby v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 72 (1974) ("[T]he change in status
which Congress had in mind was a change from an immigrant lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the status of a nonimmigrant pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1257.").
Nevertheless, necessity and common sense justify the BIA's interpretation. The opposite conclusion would be undesirable and contradictory-an alien, pronounced deportable with administrative finality, would qualify as an LPR.
79. Matter of Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 105.
80.Id.
The BIA decided against the first stage, thereby preserving an alien's right to appeal
an immigration judge's finding of deportability. Id. at 106. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.l(b)(2)
(1992); 8 C.F.R. § 242.21 (1992).
The fourth stage was disfavored as it could lead to "incongruous results." Matter of
Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 106. The BIA, in hypothesizing such a result, postulated that
"a clearly deportable alien who has exhausted all of his administrative and judicial appeal rights but whose departure cannot for some reason be enforced (e.g., for a lack of a
country that will accept him into its territory) may continue to accord designated relatives visa preference so long as he remains in this country." Id.
The third stage was also rejected. The BIA reasoned that, unlike a United States
Court of Appeals which is limited to reviewing errors of law and unfairness in procedure,
the BIA has plenary power to review an appeal de nouo. Id. at 106-07. Moreover, the BIA
believed that extending lawful status to an alien under an administratively final deportation order, pending judicial review, would encourage spurious appeals to the courts. Id.
at 107. In the BIA's opinion, such an inconvenience would far outweigh the "relatively
rare instances where the court determines that the Board erred." Id.
81. Rivera v. INS, 810 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1987), reh'g denied en bane, 816 F.2d
677 (5th Cir. 1987); Variamparambil v. INS, 831 F.2d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir. 1987).
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BIA but has terminated lawful domicile at the first stage-upon
a deportability finding by an immigration judge-in the event
the alien fails to challenge the deportation order on the merits. 82
The Eleventh Circuit, in Marti-Xiques v. INS,83 employed a
simple, yet extremely harsh, interpretation in determining when
lawful domicile terminates. The Marti-Xiques court sought to
avoid "the problem of tying the accrual of § 212(c)'s seven-year
period to the quirks and delays of the administrative and judicial processes." 84 Its solution was to set the cutoff date at the
time "the INS commences the deportation proceedings, i.e.
when the order to show cause is issued." 8 t!
The Ninth Circuit divides aliens into two different categories in determining when their lawful domicile terminates.
Aliens who challenged deportation orders on the merits would
not lose their lawful domicile while their case was on appeal to
the Ninth Circuit86 (the BIA's third stage), so long as the challenge was not frivolous. 87
82. Tim Lok II, 681 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1982). The court stressed that an immigration judge's finding of deportability must be challenged on the merits in order to
prevent lawful domicile from terminating. Id. An appeal to the BIA based solely on denial of § 212(c) relief would not be considered "on t~e merits" and, therefore, lawful
domicile would terminate. See id.
83. Marti-Xiques v. INS, 741 F.2d 350 (11th Cir. 1984).
84. Id. at 355.
85. Id. Although this is not one of the four stages considered by the BIA, at least
one commentator approves of it because:
The hardship imposed by such a rule is outweighed by its benefits; it is easily applied and treats all aliens facing deportation
equally; it decreases the probability of meritless appeals; and
it would promote the congressional goal of removing from the
immigration laws procedural devices that permit aliens to extend their stay in the United States without justification.
Matthew A. Reiber, Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act in the Federal Courts, 24 COLUM. J. TRANsNAT'L L., 623, 646 (1986).
86. Wall v. INS, 722 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984). The Wall court distinguished itself
from Tim Lok II and Marti-Xiques because there the aliens had conceded deportability.
Id. at 1444. The court reasoned that because "Wall had challenged the Board's deportability decision on petition to this court for review, his continued presence in the
United States after the administrative adjudication of deportability was a matter of law,
not grace." Id. Accordingly, Wall was allowed to accrue time on appeal toward the sevenyear requirement.
87. Where the deportability challenge was on the merits but frivolous, the Ninth
Circuit has deemed that the time on appeal to the circuit court would not be allowed.
See Torres-Hernandez v. INS, 812 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1987).
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For aliens who conceded deportability but challenged the
denial of § 212(c) relief, the Ninth Circuit, in Gonzales v. INS,88
ruled that the alien's lawful domicile would be considered terminated at the time of administrative finality (the BIA's second
stage).89 Thus, the Ninth Circuit's view prior to Butros v. INS,90
in relation to aliens who had conceded deportability but were
challenging the denial of § 212(c) relief, was identical to that of
the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits in that they all terminated lawful domicile at the time of an administratively final deportation order.

2. Motions to Reopen or Reconsider the Denial of Section
212(c) Relief
If and when § 212(c) relief is denied, the alien may move to
reopen or reconsider the decision. 91 The BIA must deny the motion if the alien is prima facie ineligible; if there is an absence of
previously unattainable, material evidence; or if § 212(c) relief
would have to be denied in the exercise of discretion. 92 Even if
the motion could be entertained, the alien still bears the heavy
burden of proving that the new evidence would likely change the
outcome of the case. 9S

Butros v. INS 94 concerned the BIA's denial of Butros' "Motion to Reopen and Reconsider" on the ground that Butros was
prima facie ineligible for § 212(c) relief. 911 The Ninth Circuit requires that an alien possess LPR status when moving to reopen
in order to preserve prima facie eligibility.98 Aliens subject to a
88. 921 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1990).
89. [d. at 240. This rule is identical to the BIA's view in Matter of Lok II. See
Matter of Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 105.
90. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993).
91. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2; see supra note 26 for the text of the regulation.
92. Matter of Coelho, Int. Dec. 3172 (BIA, Apr 30, 1992) (citing INS v. Doherty, 112
S. Ct. 719, 725 (1992)).
93. [d.

94. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993).
95. See id. at 1144-46.
96. Gonzales v. INS, 921 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Eligibility for a discretionary waiver under Section 212(c) thus requires the petitioner (1) be presently a lawful
permanent resident of the United States and (2) have a lawful unrelinquished domicile
for seven consecutive years.").
Butros overruled Gonzales to the extent that lawful domicile for § 212(c) purposes
would not terminate upon an administratively final deportation order but when the BIA
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final order of deportation lose their LPR status. 97 Such aliens in
the Ninth Circuit, then, become statutorily ineligible for
§ 212(c) relief and cannot apply for, nor move to reopen or reconsider the denial of, such relief.98
The Ninth Circuit articulated the rationale behind this approach in Gonzales. 99 The Gonzales court reasoned
if section 212(c) were available to persons after an
order of deportation is made final, then such applications would never end. An alien who was a
lawful permanent resident for seven years and is
then deported would, if Gonzales's [sic] argument
is adopted, be eligible for 212(c) waiver indefinitely, even after being deported. loo

Thus, in the Ninth Circuit, an alien loses § 212(c) eligibility
when the alien's LPR status, and concurrently the alien's lawful
domicile, terminates. lol
The Second Circuit, in Vargas v. INS,t°2 criticized the Gonzales decision for improperly denying a motion to reopen simply
because the alien's lawful domicile had ended. loa The Vargas
court stated, "we do not accept the view that a final order of
deportation also bars an alien from requesting reopening of a
properly filed Section 212(c) request. Such a motion requests no
new relief, but simply asks the BIA to reevaluate a prior action."lo4 Although not expressly stated, the Vargas court implied
that LPR status terminates upon an administratively final decould no longer reopen or reconsider the case. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1145. In so doing,
Butros passively affirmed the Gonzales requirement that present LPR status is required
for § 212(c) eligibility. See id.
97. See Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 238; Matter of Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. 101, 105 (1981).
98. See Gonzales, 921 F.2d 236, 239 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The question is whether [the
alien) was eligible under the statute at the time of her motion to reopen.").
99. In Gonzales, the alien had satisfied the seven-year requirement long before deportation proceedings commenced. Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 239. Nevertheless, she was
found statutorily ineligible for § 212(c) relief because she did not possess a lawful domicile at the time she requested relief. [d. at 239-40. Her lawful domicile was deemed to
have terminated when the immigration judge's order of deportation was affirmed by the
BIA. [d. Thus, her motion to reopen was denied as she was prima facie ineligible.
100. [d. at 240. But see infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text describing the
Butros court's revelation of the flaw in the Gonzales court's reasoning.
101. See Butros, 990 F.2d 1142; Gonzales, 921 F.2d 236.
102. 938 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1991).
103. See Vargas, 938 F.2d at 363.
104. [d.
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portation order but that the alien need not possess present LPR
status to apply for § 212(c) relief or to move to reopen the denial of such relief. The Second Circuit's concern obviously centered on the present LPR status requirement.
The Ninth Circuit focused instead on the deportation order's finality, the point at which LPR status terminates. Prior to
Butros, the LPR status of an alien who had conceded deportability terminated upon an administratively final deportation order. 1011 Accordingly, an alien's motion to reopen or reconsider would have to be denied as the alien would have lost prima
facie eligibility. lOS Following Butros, the LPR status of such an
alien terminates when the alien has physically departed the
United States. l07 Accordingly, an alien's motion to reopen or reconsider would have to be considered so long as the alien did not
leave the country. lOS
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In Butros v. INS,t°9 the Ninth Circuit had to decide
whether the BIA was correct in denying Butros' "Motion to Reopen and Reconsider" for the sole reason that Butros was under
an administratively final deportation order.llo The Ninth Circuit
had previously affirmed the denial of similar motions under the
belief that present LPR status is required to maintain eligibility
for § 212(c) relief and that an administratively final deportation
order terminates the alien's LPR status. l l l The Butros court
proceeded to review the rationale behind the existing rules.
A.

THE MAJORIT y ll2

Butros' claim hinged on whether the administratively final
deportation order terminated his LPR status and, concurrently,
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
1l0.
111.
112.

Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 238.
[d.
See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1145; 8 C.F.R. § 3.2.
See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2; see supra note 26 for the text of the regulation.

990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993).
[d. at 1144-46.
See Gonzales v. INS, 921 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1990).
Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993) (per Noonan, J.).
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the lawfulness of his domicile.l1S In the court's opinion, this determination depended on the interpretation of the statutory language "such status not having changed. "ll4 The court viewed
this as a purely legal question and proceeded to review the BIA's
decision de novo. Ill!
The court examined the BIA's regulations on motions to reconsider or to reopen.l16 These regulations did not restrict the
alien's right to move to reconsider or to reopen by any reference
to administrative finality.ll7 The court observed that the BIA
could reopen or reconsider the case on its own motion after the
point of administrative finality, so long as the alien had not
physically departed the country.llS The court believed the BIA's
position to be contradictory in that administrative finality restricted only the alien's right and not the BIA's right to reopen
or reconsider the case. l1S
The court then analyzed the legal precedent for the BIA's
decision. Specifically, the court examined the reasoning in Matter of Lok IIl20 and Gonzales v. INS.121 The court recognized the
policy concerns addressed in Matter of Lok II, including the
danger of SpUrlOU~ appeals and "inherently incongruous"
113. The majority implicitly affirmed Gonzales' requirement that an alien must possess LPR status at the time § 212(c) relief is sought. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1144-46;
Gonzales v. INS, 921 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1990); see supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Gonzales requirement.
114. Id. at 1144 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1988)).
115. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1144 (citing Abedini v. INS, 971 F.2d 188, 190-91 (9th Cir.
1992) ("We review de novo the Board's determination of purely legal questions regarding
the requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act.")).
116. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1144; see 8 C.F.R. § 3.2; see supra note 26 for the text of
the regulation.
117. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1144.
118. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.2).
119. Id. The court observed:
If the Board's original decision were final as to the status of
the petitioner for discretionary relief, then of course there
would be no such thing as reconsideration or reopening for the
petitioner who lost on the first round. But to say, as the
Board's regulations do say, that you may have a second round
and at the same time to say, as the Board says here, you may
not have a second round, is to engage in contradiction.
Id.
120. 18 I. & N. Dec. 101 (1981).
121. 921 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1990).
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results. 122 The court then observed that the Second Circuit had
restricted Matter of Lok II to the class of aliens who had satisfied the seven-year requirement when they got into trouble with
the law because the policy concerns were not as prevalent with
respect to this class of aliens. 123
The court went on to address the concern raised in Gonzales that physically departed aliens would be eligible for § 212(c)
relief absent a bar based on administrative finality.124 The court
recognized that the BIA's own regulation effectively met this
concern by prohibiting the reopening or reconsidering of any
case "subsequent to [the alien's] departure from the United
States."121i
Butros overruled Gonzales. 126 The Butros court perceived
Gonzales' fallacy to be "the belief that what is final for certain
administrative purposes is final for all purposes. "127 The Butros
court noted the BIA's recognition that "when appellate review
exists, what looks like a final status can well turn out not to be a
final status. "128 The court also gave considerable weight to the
BIA's ability to reopen or reconsider cases on its own motion. 129
The court then stated that "[s]ince the Board's own practice, as
well as its own regulation, establishes that for purposes of another look by the Board the status is not final, there can be no
pretense of anything so simple as one all-embracing notion of
122. Butros, 990 F.2d 1145. The court cited as an example of an inherently incongruous result, a deportable alien "having the right to accord a designated relative a visa
preference so long as the alien remained in this country." Id.
123. Vargas v. INS, 938 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1991). Recall, the Ninth Circuit, in Gonzales, extended Matter of Lok II's reasoning to situations where the seven-year requirement was a moot issue. Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 238. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text discussing Matter of Lok II's reasoning. Thus, an administratively final
deportation order was deemed to terminate any alien's LPR sta·tus and, more importantly, their eligibility for § 212(c) relief. See Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 238. The Gonzales
court expressed concern that extending § 212(c) relief beyond an administratively final
decision would result in all aliens, including those already deported, being able to qualify. Id. at 240.
124. Id. This concern led the Gonzales court to extend Matter of Lok II's reasoning
to cases where the alien had already satisfied the seven-year requirement.
125. Id. at 1146 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.2).
126. Id. at 1145. See infra notes 221-60 and accompanying text discussing the
ramifications of the Ninth Circuit's reversal.
127. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1145 ("[W)hen appellate review exists, what looks like a
final status can well turn out not to be a final status. ").
128. Id. (citing Matter of Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. 101, 107).
129. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.2).
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finality."130 Because no decision would ever be truly final, the
Gonzales rule, which terminated eligibility for § 212(c) relief at
the time of administrative finality, would be devoid of meaning.
The Butros court then ruled that "so long as the Board may
reconsider or reopen the case, the status of the petitioner in that
case for purposes of § 212(c) relief has not been finally determined for purposes of action by the Board."131
B.

THE CONCURRENCE l32

Judge Fernandez characterized the issue as being straightforward. 133 The regulations allowed for the reopening of any decision, at any time, unless the alien had departed the country.134
Because the regulations did not require the alien to maintain
LPR status in order to reopen, Judge Fernandez saw no reason
not to grant the motion to reopen. 1311
He apparently believed that administrative finality did not
130. [d.
131. [d. The court also stated that "the Board erred in determining that the statutory language on change of status applies to an alien whose case may be appealed, reconsidered, or reopened." Viewed under the BIA's four stages upon which lawful domicile
could terminate, the Ninth Circuit's ruling seemingly extended the time of termination
from the second stage (administrative finality) to the third stage (appeal) and to the
fourth stage (physical departure). See supra note 79 and accompanying text listing the
four stages first announced in Matter of Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 105.
In reaching its conclusion, the court stressed that it did not determine whether Butros' motions to reopen or to reconsider should have been granted. Butros, 990 F.2d at
1146. The court further limited its ruling by stating that:
We are not deciding when an alien ceases to accumulate credit
toward seven years of lawful permanent residence. By the
same token we are not deciding the status of an alien subject
to a deportation order for purposes of giving visa priority to a
relative.
[d. Rather, the case was remanded for the BIA to determine the merits of Butros' arguments to reopen or reconsider. [d.
132. Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142, 1146 (Fernandez, J. concurring, joined by Beezer,
J. and Hall, J.).
133. See id. ("[T]he issue is a simple procedural one; it is a question of whether a
determination of the BIA can be reopened and reconsidered at any time, regardless of
the type of issue involved. As I see it the majority says, 'yes.' I do not see that as a
radical or shocking answer, so I agree.").
134. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2; see supra note 26 for text of the regulation.
135. See id. Judge Fernandez apparently interpreted § 212(c) not to require that an
alien be a lawful permanent resident at the time relief is sought. Since the regulations
did not expressly bar the motion, Butros would be considered statutorily eligible. For
this reason, Judge Fernandez favored granting Butros' request.
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preclude an alien from reopening a case. Instead, he viewed finality as "a somewhat fluid concept in law, as it is in nature-at
least until the entropy of the universe."ls6 Judge Fernandez recognized that Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allows district court decisions to be reviewed and upset long after becoming final. ls7 He further observed that criminal decisions can be overturned in habeas corpus proceedings long after
being declared final. ls8
In light of his analysis, Judge Fernandez saw no reason to
consider cases and arguments regarding the "species of finality"
for purposes of appealing to the Ninth Circuit. lsB Furthermore,
Judge Fernandez declined to consider cases and arguments regarding the accrual of time toward the seven-year requirement
during the appeals process. 140 Judge Fernandez reasoned that:
Those cases deal with precisely the same words in
the statutory provision that we deal with here. Although it might be exceedingly difficult to say
that those words could have different meanings
for our purpose . . . we need not discuss the issue. All we need to do is hold the BIA to the regulations the INS has adopted. If the INS now
wishes to adopt different regulations, that route is
available to it.141

In his view, the regulations controlled the ruleY2 Thus, Judge
Fernandez reasoned any change in the rule should be brought
about through a change in the regulations, not a change in their
interpretation. 14s
136. Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142, 1146 (1993).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. [d. (distinguishing Chu v. INS, 875 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1989». In Chu, the BIA
had affirmed the immigration judge's deportation order. Chu, 875 F.2d at 779. Chu then
moved that the BIA reconsider. [d. Before the BIA ruled on his motion to reconsider,
Chu petitioned the Ninth Circuit for review. Id. The Chu court dismissed the petition
for review because the pending motion for BIA reconsideration rendered the deportation
order non-final. [d. at 780-81.
140. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1146 (citing Avila-Murrieta v. INS, 762 F.2d 733, 735 (9th
Cir. 1985».
141. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1146 ("[It] is not to say that a particular person will make a
convincing argument for reopening; it is just to say that the person is not precluded at
the outset. ").
142. See id.
143. [d.
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THE DISSENT 144

Judge Trott prefaced his analysis by castigating Butros and
the system which has allowed him to stay in the United
States. 141i Judge Trott wrote:
Butros was ordered deported on May 26,
1988-almost five years ago. I write this dissent
on March 15, 1993. Butros is still here. He has
abused the privilege of living in this country by
using and selling cocaine, the latter while on probation no less. When caught, he lied and arrogantly attempted to manipulate the system. Now,
he claims he is entitled to another chance to convince the INS he merits discretionary relief. Butros' statement to Fisher that the government is
powerless to do anything to him was prescient. l4S

Judge Trott began his analysis by exposing the paradox created by applying different rules based solely on whether or not
the alien has satisfied the seven-year requirement. 147 He then
criticized the majority's choice of a de novo review. H8 Judge
Trott next analyzed and approved the BIA's reasoning in establishing its rules which the majority struck down. H9 Judge Trott _
proceeded to review the current state of the law in different
circuits. 1liO
1. Paradox Created by the Diverging Rules m the Ninth
Circuit
Judge Trott criticized the majority's opinion as being contradictory. Judge Trott explained that the majority's analysis
144. Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1993) (Trott, J., dissenting, joined
by Brunetti, J.).
145. [d. at 1146-47.
146. [d. at 1147. Fisher was a Special Agent of the Portland Immigration Office.
R.B. at 6.
147. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1147.
148. [d. at 1148.
149. [d. at 1150. Judge Trott opined that the BIA's rule to terminate LPR status
upon the entry of a final administrative order of deportation was "a cogent solution to'a
problem which has no obvious or clear answer. As such, [Judge Trott] would accord the
BIA's solution the considerable weight it is due under Chevron." [d.
150. [d. at 1151.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994

23

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 6

630

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:607

categorizes an alien as an LPR for the purpose of moving to reopen deportation proceedings but not as an LPR for the related
purpose of accumulating time toward the seven-year
requirement. lin
2.

Standard of Review

Judge Trott flatly disagreed with the majority's choice of a
de novo standard of review. 1II2 Observing that the decision
turned "not on statutory construction, but on the workings of
regulations," he concluded that "the cited standard of review is
irrelevant to the analysis."11l3 Rather, when reviewing a federal
administrative agency's decision, he favored according deference
to the "agency's interpretation of its governing statute with respect to the filling of 'any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by
Congress.' "1114
Judge Trott approved of the explanation of this rule of deference as presented in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. lllll According to Chevron, a reviewing court determines whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. 11l6 If their intent is clear, the court as well as
the agency must abide by the "unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress."11l7 In the event Congress has not directly addressed
the precise question, the court should only consider whether
"the administrative agency's standard is based on a permissible
construction of the statute."11l8 Judge Trott observed that the
151. Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142, 1147 (Trott, J., dissenting). The distinction exposed by Judge Trott does not follow from the definitions of either the word "lawful" or
"resident" or any combination thereof. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 885, 1309 (6th ed.
1990).
152. Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 1993) (Trott, J., dissenting). Under
a 'de novo standard of review, the Ninth Circuit could impose its own interpretation of
§ 212(c) on the BIA. Under the deferential standard of review favored by Judge Trott,
the Ninth Circuit's role would be limited to asking only whether the BIA's interpretation
was permissible. Judge Trott wrote, "the [majority's) opinion claims de novo power to
interpret the statutes under consideration and to tell the INS how to construe and apply
its regulations regarding motions to reopen. I respectfully believe the law is to the contrary." [d.
153. [d.
154. [d. (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974».
155. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1148 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984».
156. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
157. [d.
158. [d.
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Ninth Circuit had followed the Chevron approach in AyalaChavez v. fNSlr>e with respect to § 212(c) interpretation. 160 Such
an approach, he opined, would preserve national uniformity in
the treatment of an agency's application of federal law. 161
In Judge Trott's opinion, Butros' appeal dealt with a gap in
the law. 162 The statutes were silent on when eligibility for
§ 212(c) relief, as well as accrual of time toward the seven-year
requirement, terminates. 16s The statutes were also silent on reopening and reconsidering deportation proceedings. 164 According
to Judge Trott, it was the agency's regulations, and not the statute, which governed Butros' motion to reopen and to reconsider. 16r> For these reasons, Judge Trott would have accorded
deference to the BIA's interpretation of the statute and would
not have applied a de novo standard of review. 166
3.

Soundness of the BfA's Rule

Judge Trott identified the issue in this case as being
"whether an alien who has conceded deportability and been denied discretionary relief under § 212(c) of the Act may be precluded by the [BIA] from making a motion to reopen for additional § 212(c) discretionary consideration on the ground the
alien is no longer eligible for such consideration."167 Judge Trott
recognized that the BIA deemed an alien statutorily ineligible
159. 944 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1990). The Ayala-Chavez court gave considerable deference to the BIA's statutory interpretation. [d. at 641. It further noted:
[Cjourts have always interpreted broadly the discretionary authority of the Attorney General to grant or deny waiver of
deportation. Inherent in this discretion is the authority of the
Attorney General and his subordinates to establish general
standards that govern the exercise of such discretion, as long
as these standards are rationally related to the statutory
scheme.
[d.

160. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1148.
161. [d.
162. [d.
163. [d.
164. [d. (citing INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992) (holding the authority for
reopening deportation proceedings is derived solely from regulations promulgated by the
Attorney General».
165. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1)048.
166. See id.
167. Butros V. INS, 990 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 1993) (Trott, J., dissenting).
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for § 212(c) relief when a deportation order becomes administratively final. 168 At such time, a motion to reopen would not be
entertained. 169 He noted that the Ninth Circuit, prior to Butros,
had followed this approach. l7O
Judge Trott proceeded to analyze the BIA's position with
respect to terminating lawful dOIl)icile, and § 212(c) eligibility,
at the time of an administratively final deportation order.l7l He
concluded that" [i]t makes no logical sense to grant a motion to
reopen deportation proceedings for the purpose of considering
an alien's application for § 212(c) relief when an alien has lost
prima facie eligibility for such relief because he or she is no
longer is (sic) a permanent resident."m As the BIA's determination as to Butros was' "a cogent solution to a problem which has
no obvious or clear answer," Judge Trott would accord it deference arid preserve Gonzales. 173

4. Circuit Split
Judge Trott reviewed the discordant views of other circuits
with respect to terminating eligibility for § 212(c) relief"'· He
observed that the Fifth and Seventh Circuits affirmed the BIA's
conclusion to terminate eligibility when a deportation order becomes administratively final. l7II He stressed that such a rule is
sensible as "it gives the alien ample time to assert his claim for
§ 212(c) relief and prevents him from litigating his various
claims in piecemeal fashion."176
Judge Trott then recognized how infidelity to the BIA's position has led to a multi-faceted circuit split. 177 He speculated
that such a split assures only uncertainty in the INS's quest to
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

[d. at 1150.
[d.
[d. (citing Gonzales v. INS, 921 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1990).
[d.
[d.
[d.

174. Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142, 1151-53 (9th Cir. 1993).
175. [d. at 1151 (citing Variamparambil v. INS, 831 F.2d 1362 (7th Cir. 1987); Rivera v. INS, 810 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1987)).
176. [d. at 1151 (citing Rivera, 810 F.2d at 542).
177. See id. at 1152.
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equitably enforce the law across the nation. 178 In particular,
Judge Trott noted the Eleventh Circuit's choice to terminate eligibility when the order to show cause is issued, as well as the
Second Circuit's exception for deportation orders which are not
challenged on the merits.179 He postulated that the majority's
holding would raise "more questions than it answers. "180 He
questioned whether
a motion to reconsider the denial of a motion to
reopen [would] prevent the quickening of finality? . . . Will these proceedings ever come to a
conclusion? The majority opinion would do well
to give this new rule more thought and more substance. It would appear, as it does to the INS,
that this new rule "would recognize no finality
(other than the 'physical deportation' of the alien
from the United States) to an alien's right to seek
reopening of deportation proceedings to further
pursue an application for such relief even beyond
the point that a loss of lawful permanent resident
status clearly has occurred."181

Judge Trott expressed concern over adopting a new interpretation to a statute which is already disparately applied by the
various circuits.182 He would have affirmed Gonzales, thereby
maintaining allegiance, and observing deference, to the BIA's interpretation of § 212(c).183

v.

CRITIQUE

The Ninth Circuit, in Butros v. INS,184 ruled that a deportation order, affirmed by the BIA, is not final so long as the case
is appealable or the BIA is able to reopen or reconsider the case
on its own motion. 1811 Consequently, an alien under a non-final
deportation order retains LPR status, and lawful domicile, for
178. [d.
179. [d. at 1151 (citing Marti-Xiques v. INS, 741 F.2d 350, 355 (11th Cir. 1984) and
Vargas v. INS, 938 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1991)).
180. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1151.
181. [d. (citing Matter of Cerna, Int. Dec. 3161 app. at 11 n. 1 (BIA Oct 7, 1991)).
182. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1152.
183. [d. at 1153.
184. Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993).
185. [d. at 1145.
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purposes of seeking § 212(c) relief. 186 Because the BIA is precluded from reopening or reconsidering only when an alien has
physically departed the country, the rule, in effect, does not recognize a deportation order to be final while an alien remains in
the United States. 187
Nairn Butros obviously benefitted from the ruling because it
allowed him to stave off imminent deportation and argue his
motion to reopen and reconsider his case, fqr purposes of seeking § 212(c) relief.1 88 As to Butros, such a result is fair, given the
peculiar set of facts in his case.189 However, the Ninth Circuit's
rule is problematic because its inherent uncertainty may produce unintelligible distinctions or incongruous results. ISO It also
adds a new interpretation to the growing circuit split enveloping
§ 212(c).lsl
The existing confusion could have been prevented had the
Ninth Circuit abolished the requirement that aliens maintain
present LPR status to preserve § 212(c) eligibility.ls2 The present-LPR-status requirement was created in Gonzales u. INS/s3
186. The Ninth Circuit expressly declined to decide whether the same alien would
retain LPR status for purposes of accumulating time toward the seven-year requirement.
[d. at 1146.
187. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2; see also supra note 26 for the text of the regulation.
188. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1146.
189. Recall that Butros has lived in the United States since the age of six. [d. at
1142. His family resides lawfully in the United States. See supra note 21. His involvement with drugs stemmed from legally prescribed doses of Percodan, a dependency-causing drug, following a severe motorcycle accident. See supra note 18.
190. See infra notes 244-49 discussing potential problems created by the Butros
rule.
The Ninth Circuit's ruling also stands to benefit deportable aliens who cannot be
physically deported. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1253(g) (1988) (imposing sanctions on countries
which deny or delay acceptance of deportees); 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. IV 1992) (restricting physical deportation when the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in the
destined country). Under the Butros rule, a deportable alien who cannot be physically
deported could not be considered to have lost LPR status. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2; see supra
note 26 for the text of the regulation. Under the Butros rule such aliens, unlike their
counterparts who had been physically deported, could likely maintain indefinite eligibility for § 212(c) relief. Such a result is unfair because the distinguishing characteristic-conditions in the country the alien would be deported to-is, first, beyond the
alien's control and, second, logically unrelated to statutory eligibility for § 212(c) relief.
191. See infra notes 250-60 and accompanying text discussing the growing circuit
split.
192. See infra notes 261-80 and accompanying text discussing such an approach.
193. 921 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1990).
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through a misunderstanding of Matter of Lok II.194 Although
Butros overruled Gonzales, it passively affirmed Gonzales' present-LPR-status requirement. 1911 Had the Ninth Circuit correctly
interpreted Matter of Lok II, they could have afforded Butros
the relief he fairly deserved and avoided the present enigmatic
fallout.

A.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S MISINTERPRETATION OF MATTER OF LOK

II
The Ninth Circuit, in Butros v. INS/96 as well as in Gonzales v. INS,197 arguably misinterpreted the BIA's position in Matter of Lok II.198 In Matter of Lok II, Tim Lok had not attained
the requisite seven years of lawful domicile when his deportation
order became administratively final. I99 By the time the case had
passed through the immigration judge, the BIA (first-time),200
the Second Circuit,201 back to the BIA on remand,202 back to the
immigration judge on remand, and was certified to the BIA (second-time),203 Lok had attained a seven-year domicile.
The BIA, obviously disturbed by the prospect of aliens accumulating seven years of domicile while their cases were on appeal, held Lok's lawful domicile expired when the original deportation order became administratively final. 204 An important
factor in the BIA's reasoning was avoiding the incentive an opposite conclusion would create for aliens to file "spurious appeals," thereby accumulating time toward the seven-year requirement. 2011 Accordingly, the BIA ruled that an
administratively final deportation order terminates LPR sta194. See infra notes 197-220 and accompanying text discussing the Gonzales court's
misinterpretation of Matter of Lok II.
195. See infra notes 226-34 arid accompanying text discussing Butros' passive affirmance of the Gonzales requirement.
196. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993).
197. 921 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1990).
198. 18 I. & N. Dec. 101 (1981).
199. [d. at 104.
200. Matter of Lok I, 15 I. & N. Dec. 720 (1976). Lok's lawful domicile commenced
in 1971. [d. at 721.
201. Tim Lok I, 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1977).
202. Matter of Lok, 16 I. & N. Dec. 441 (1978).
203. Matter of Lok II, '18 I. & N. Dec. 101 (1981).
204. [d. at 110.
205. [d. at 107.
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tuS. 206 At the time of administrative finality, Lok had accrued a
lawful domicile of less than five years. 207 Thus, Lok was held
statutorily ineligible for § 212(c) relief.208
The Matter of Lok II holding is susceptible to two interpretations. Either Lok did not satisfy the seven-year domicile requirement, or present LPR status is required to apply for
§ 212(c) relief. 20D A close reading of Matter of Lok II suggests
that Lok's motion was denied solely because he did not satisfy
the seven-year lawful domicile requirement.2lO
The BIA's opinion contained two headings, "Termination of
Lawful Permanent Resident Status,"211 followed later by "Lawfulness of Domicile Prior to Admission as Lawful Permanent
Resident. "212 The analysis regarding the termination of LPR
status upon the administrative finality of a deportation order
was fully contained under the first heading. 213 Had the BIA required present LPR status to apply for § 212(c) relief, they
could have found Lok statutorily ineligible without having to
discuss the commencement of his lawful domicile under the second heading. The BIA must have proceeded to discuss the commencement of Lok's lawful domicile, then, because it did not require present LPR status as a prerequisite for § 212(c)
eligibility. Viewed this way, the BIA's intent in Matter of Lok
II, seems clear-determine whether Lok had a seven-year domicile by establishing when his lawful domicile began and
ceased. 214 It seems apparent that the BIA never intended to re206. [d. at 105.
207. [d.
208. [d.

209. Under either interpretation, Tim Lok would have been statutorily ineligible for
§ 212(c) because he possessed less than seven years of lawful domicile and because his

LPR status terminated before he sought relief.
210. See Matter of Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 105-10.
211. [d. at 105.
212. [d. at 108. Under this heading, the BIA discussed whether the time Lok spent
in the United States prior to obtaining LPR status would count toward his seven-year
lawful domicile.
213. See id. at 105-07.
214. The BIA concluded:
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, we conclude that
the respondent's lawful domicile began with his admission for
lawful permanent residence on December 26, 1971, and ended
with the termination of his lawful permanent resident status
on July 30, 1976, when the order of deportation outstanding
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quire an alien maintain present LPR status when applying for
§ 212(c) relief.
The Ninth Circuit, in Gonzales, misinterpreted Matter of
Lok II to require present LPR status.2lII Accordingly, the Ninth
Circuit believed that an administratively final deportation order,
which divests an alien's LPR status, serve"s as an absolute bar to
seeking § 212(c) relief. 216 As a result, the Ninth Circuit effectively requires deportable alien to possess present LPR status
when applying for § 212(c) relief from deportation. 217 This result appears to contradict the purpose behind offering relief
from deportation. If deportability acts as a bar to seeking
§ 212(c) relief from deportation, then an alien would only be allowed to seek relief from deportation while not deportable-while still recognized as a lawful permanent resident of
the United States.
A misinterpretation of Matter of Lok II resulted in the paradox embodied in Gonzales. The Butros court, perhaps seeking
to avoid imposing an absolute bar to seeking relief, overruled
Gonzales to the extent that Gonzales terminated LPR status at
the time of an administratively final deportation order.218 However, since the Butros court incorrectly interpreted Matter of
Lok II, as did the Gonzales court, the resulting modification has,
arguably, caused more confusion than resolution. For example,
the Butros court left open whether the rule would be applied to
aliens who have not met the seven-year requirement. 219 The Buagainst him became administratively final. We thus hold that
the respondent is statutorily ineligible for the relief he seeks
under section 212(c) of the [INA).
Id. at 110.
215. See Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 238.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 239.
218. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1145.
219. Id. at 1146. If the Butros rule is applied to aliens with a sub-seven-year lawful
domicile, then these aliens could become eligible for § 212(c) relief while their cases proceeded through the courts. This result is undesirable as it could lead to the filing of
spurious appeals to keep the case in court. See, e.g., Matter of Lok II, 18 1. & N. Dec. at
107 (1981).
If the Butros rule is not applied to aliens with a sub-seven-year lawful domicile, then
the Ninth Circuit's distinction would be arbitrary. For example, a deportation order issued by the BIA would be sufficiently final to terminate the LPR status of an alien with
a sub-seven-year lawful domicile, whereas an equivalent deportation order would not be
sufficiently final to terminate the LPR status of an alien with a seven-year-plus lawful
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tros court also declined to decide whether aliens under administratively final deportation orders could continue to accord relatives visa preferences. 22o
B.

OVERRULING GONZALES

Butros v. INS221 and Gonzales v INS222 presented remarkably similar fact patterns.223 Nevertheless, Butros overruled Gonzales insofar as the latter terminated LPR status at the time of
an administratively final deportation order.224 The second component of Gonzales, that LPR status is required at the time
§ 212(c) relief is sought, was passively affirmed. 2211
1.

The Ninth Circuit Justifiably Overruled Gonzales But
Passively Affirmed the LPR-Status Requirement
The Ninth Circuit, in Butros v. INS,226 asserted that "the

domicile. The Ninth Circuit's recognition of a final deportation order would necessarily
hinge on whether or not the alien possessed a seven-year lawful domicile. This result is
also undesirable because the finality of a deportation order is logically unrelated to the
length of an alien's lawful domicile.
220. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1146. If the Butros rule allowed aliens under administratively final deportation orders to accord relatives visa preferences, then such aliens could
petition relatives into the United States while they, themselves, are in the process of
exiting the country. This result is obviously undesirable. See, e,g., Matter of Lok II, 18 I.
& N. Dec. at 106 (1981) (labeling such a scenario an "incongruous result."».
If the Butros rule did not allow aliens under administratively final deportation orders to accord relatives visa preferences, then the alien would not really have complete
LPR status. The Ninth Circuit would have to recognize a quasi-LPR status which allows
the alien some, but not all, benefits of lawful residence in the United States. This result
is also undesirable because is opens the door to limiting the LPR status of legal
immigrants.
221. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993).
222. 921 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1990).
223. Both Butros and Gonzales lawfully resided in the United States for well over
seven years before being charged with deportation. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1142-43;
Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 237. Both conceded deportability but sought § 212(c) relief. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1143; Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 237. In both cases, § 212(c) relief was denied and the deportation order was affirmed by the BIA. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1143; Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 237. Both Butros and Gonzales then made a motion pursuant to 8
C.F.R. § 3.2 asking the BIA to reevaluate the denial of § 212(c) relief. Butros, 990 F.2d
at 1143; Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 237. The BIA denied the motions because the alien lost
LPR status upon the administrative finality of the deportation order. Butros, 990 F.2d at
1143; Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 238.
224. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1145.
225. See Butros, 990 F.2d 1142.
226. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993).
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fallacy of Gonzales is the belief that what is final for certain administrative purposes is final for all purposes. "227 The Butros
court then reasoned that an administratively final deportation
order may not be truly final because the BIA could reopen or
reconsider,228 and had done so in the past.229 Accordingly, recognition of finality was extended to the point at which the BIA
could no longer reopen or reconsider the case. 230
The Butros court overruled Gonzales and redefined finality.231 Conversely, the court passively affirmed the Gonzales requirement that an alien must possess present LPR status to be
eligible for § 212(c) relief. 232 The Gonzales requirement was
based on a misinterpretation of Matter of Lok II.233 It is unsupported by statutory language or legislative history.23' The requirement even defies common sense: If the purpose of § 212(c)
is to offer relief from deportation and if deportation terminates
LPR status, would it not defeat § 212(c)'s purpose to require
LPR status to seek relief from deportation? If the Ninth Circuit
were to answer "No," then isn't § 212(c) relief from deportation
available to only those aliens who have not been found
deportable?
As justification for overruling Gonzales, the Butros court
seized upon Gonzales' illogical concern that aliens who had departed the country would qualify for § 212(c) relief. 23Ii The Butros court correctly pointed out that the BIA's regulations expressly prevented physically-departed aliens from moving to
reopen or reconsider.236 The Gonzales court apparently ignored
227. Id. at 1145 (criticizing Gonzales v. INS, 921 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1990)).
228. The BrA is only prohibited from reopening or reconsidering cases of aliens who
have physically departed the country. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2; see supra note 26 for the text
of the regulation.
229. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1145.
230. See id.
231. Id. at 1145.
232. See id. at 1144-46.
233. 181. & N. Dec. 101; see supra notes 197-220 and accompanying text describing
how the misinterpretation arose.
234. See supra note 2 for the language of the statute. Recall, the legislative discussions regarding § 212(c) did not anticipate its application to deportation proceedings.
235. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1145-46.
236. Id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 ("A motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not
be made by or in behalf of a person who is the subject of deportation proceedings subsequent to his departure from the United States.").
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judicial affirmance of the administratively final deportation order as a stage, prior to the physical-departure stage, when an
alien could be deemed to have lost LPR status. 237 Had the Ninth
Circuit been solely interested in correcting this oversight, the
appropriate solution, in Butros, could have been to rule that an
alien loses LPR status only after review by the Ninth Circuit.238
By ruling that for purposes of § 212(c) relief, an alien maintains
eligibility until physical deportation and not until the deportation order is judicially affirmed, the Ninth Circuit displayed its
willingness to correct Gonzales but failed to address the underlying problem at Gonzales' core.
2.

In Overruling Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit Has Created
Different Deference Standards With Respect to the Commencement and Termination of Lawful Domicile

In overruling Gonzales v. INS,239 the Ninth Circuit declined
to defer to the BIA's judgment as to when lawful domicile terminates.240 This decision cannot be reconciled with the Ninth Circuit's decision to defer to the BIA on the issue of when lawful
domicile commences. 241 Such selective deference is no deference
at all. The Ninth Circuit seemingly professes to defer to the
BIA's reasoned judgment, but only if it agrees with that
judgment.
237. See Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 238-41. Judicial affirmance of an administratively
final deportation order is precisely the third stage the BIA considered. See supra note 79
and accompanying text listing the stages upon which the deportation order could be
deemed final.
238. This solution more appropriately addresses Gonzales' concern regarding indefinite § 212(c) eligibility. Viewed in terms of the four stages suggested by the BIA, in
Matter of Lok II, the Gonzales court feared the fourth stage. See Matter of Lok II 18 I.
& N. Dec. 101, 105 (1981) (describing the second stage as administrative finality, the
third stage as judicial finality, and the fourth stage as physical departure); see also supra
notes 76-80 and accompanying text discussing the BIA's four-stage analysis. The Gonzales court strongly disapproved of the fourth stage and responded by adopting the second
stage. Inexplicably, they skipped over the third stage without apparently recognizing its
existence. If this oversight was all the Butros court sought to correct, they could have
limited their holding to terminate LPR status at the third, and not the fourth, stage.
239. 921 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1990).
240. See Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142, 1144-46 (9th Cir. 1992). Recall, the domicile
accrued by an alien while an LPR qualifies as a lawful domicile. Therefore, once stripped
of LPR status, the alien's lawful domicile simultaneously ends.
241. Castillo-Felix v. INS, 601 F.2d 459, 465 (9th Cir. 1979). See also supra note 74
discussing the commencement of lawful domicile.
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The Butros decision is better understood by analyzing the
context in which it was decided. First, the majority may have
been swayed by the facts and was thus compelled to grant relief.
Recall, Butros had a relatively low degree of criminal involvement242 and deportation would have inflicted a severe hardship
upon him.243 Second, such relief could not be granted unless
Gonzales was distinguished or overruled. Since the material
facts in Gonzales paralleled those in Butros, distinguishing the
cases, convincingly, would likely have been difficult. Finally, the
majority did not observe the fine distinction within Matter of
Lok II-that LPR status is only required to calculate the sevenyear lawful domicile requirement and not to file a motion to reopen or reconsider the denial of § 212(c) relief. The net result is a
rule which partially compensates for Gonzales' shortcomings,
but unwisely preserves an alien's LPR status beyond the point
of an administratively final deportation order.
C.

POTENTIAL PROBLEMS CAUSED

By

THE BUTROS RULE

The Ninth Circuit, in Butros v. INS,244 emphasized that it
was not deciding "when an alien ceases to accumulate credit toward seven years of lawful permanent residence."245 However, to
prevent those aliens with a sub-seven-year lawful domicile from
benefitting under the Butros rule, the Ninth Circuit, in future
cases, would have to either (1) terminate an alien's LPR status
only if the alien did not possess a seven-year lawful domicile
when the deportation order became administratively final or
(2) rule that at the time of an administratively final deportation
order, an alien loses LPR status unless the alien is seeking to
reopen or reconsider deportation proceedings to seek § 212(c)
relief·
242. Cf, Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 237. Gonzales had been convicted of four unrelated
crimes: (1) in 1976, for receiving stolen property; (2) in 1983, for disturbing the peace; (3)
in 1984, for aiding and abetting an armed robbery; and (4) in 1985, for being under the
influence of heroin and for possession of a hypodermic needle.
By contrast Butros' record reflected only one conviction at the time of his § 212(c)
hearing. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text discussing Butros' criminal
involvement.
243. See supra notes 18 and 21 relating facts which suggest that deportation would
severely penalize Butros.
244. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993).
245. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1146.
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Both alternatives are flawed. Under the first option, aliens
possessing seven-years of lawful domicile would not lose their
LPR status until physically deported. 246 Thus, such aliens awaiting the flight back home would be entitled to all the rights and
privileges reserved for LPRs. Such deportable aliens could then
sponsor relatives to enter the United States as LPRs.247 In the
event deportation could not be completed,248 the legal status of
such aliens would be unaffected by the deportation process.
Such results are quite obviously unacceptable.
Under the second option, aliens moving to reopen or reconsider deportation proceedings to seek § 212(c) relief would retain LPR status, whereas non-moving aliens would not. Such a
rule is wholly undesirable because the determination as to an
alien's lawful permanent resident status would lie within the
alien's, and not the government's, control. Such a scenario could
arguably motivate the filing' of spurious motions to reopen or reconsider an adverse ruling by the BIA to preserve LPR status. It
could also foreseeably lead to inconsistent LPR-status classifications. For example, an alien would be considered an LPR to
move to reopen or reconsider the denial of § 212(c) relief, but
the same alien would not be considered an LPR for the related
purpose of accumulating time toward the seven-year
requirement.249

D.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ADDITION TO THE CIRCUIT SPLITTING
PROBLEM

The Ninth Circuit's ruling has also added more complexity
to an area of the law already replete with inconsistencies. 250
With respect to when lawful domicile commences, at present,
246. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2; see supra note 26 for the text of the regulation.
247. See Matter of Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. 101, 106 (1981) (disapproving of a rule
which allowed deportable aliens to accord relatives visa preference so long as the aliens
remain in this country).
248. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1253(g) (imposing sanctions on countries which deny or
delay acceptance of deportees); 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. IV 1992) (restricting physical
deportation when the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in the destined
country).
249. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1147 (Trott, J., dissenting).
250. Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993). See supra notes 73-108 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the various § 212(c) interpretations employed by circuit courts.
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the Fourth and Ninth Circuits follow the BIA's approach requiring the alien to establish a lawful domicile after being lawfully
admitted for permanent residence. 2111 The Second and D.C. Circuits, however, may allow the alien to accrue the time he lawfully resided in the United States, prior to admission as an LPR,
as part of his lawful dom~cile. m
With respect to when lawful domicile terminates, the Fifth
and Seventh Circuits abide by the BIA's reasoning in terminating lawful domicile upon an administratively final deportation
order.m The Second and Ninth Circuits agree with the BIA so
long as the alien has conceded deportability.2114 The Eleventh
Circuit, through its simple and effective, though extremely
harsh, solution, terminates lawful domicile when the order to
show cause is issued. 21111
With respect to motions to reopen or reconsider the denial
of § 212(c) relief, the Ninth Circuit, prior to Butros, required
that the alien possess present. LPR status to maintain statutory
eligibility.2116 The Second Circuit apparently allows such motions
if the alien was statutorily eligible when deportation proceedings
began. 2117
Despite the existing multiplicity of § 212(c) constructions,
the Ninth Circuit has now unveiled its own peculiar interpretation,2118 one that is as distinct from the prevailing views as they
are from each other.2119 With so many different applications of

\

251. See Chiravacharadhikul v. INS, 645 F.2d 248, 250 (4th Cir. 1981); Castillo-Felix
v. INS, 601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979); Matter of Lok l, 15 I. & N. Dec. 720 (1976).
252. See Tim Lok I, 548 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1977); Anwo v. INS, 607 F.2d 435, 437
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
.
253. See Rivera v. INS, 810 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1987); Variamparambil v. INS,
831 F.2d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir. 1987); Matter of Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. 101, 105 (1981); see
also supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text discussing the BIA's reasoning.
254. See Tim Lok II, 681 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1982); Wall v. INS, 722 F.2d 1442,
1444 (9th Cir. 1984).
255. See Marti-Xiques v. INS, 741 F.2d 355 (11th Cir. 1984); see also supra notes
83-85 and accompanying text discussing the Eleventh Circuit's approach.
256. See Gonzales v. INS, 921 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1993); see also supra notes 96101 and accompanying text discussing the Gonzales rationale.
257. See Vargas v. INS, 938 F.2d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 1991); see also supra notes 10204 and accompanying text discussing the Second Circuit's view.
258. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1145.
259. ld. at 1151-53 (Trott, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 176-85 and accompanying text summarizing Judge Trott's discussion of the various views.
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the same federal statute, Judge Trott was certainly prudent to
admonish "[w]hat happens to an alien in this context depends
entirely on where it happens."26o
E.

THE BETTER VIEW

The better solution would be to terminate LPR status at
the time of administrative finality but to abolish the presentLPR-status requirement as a prerequisite to seeking § 212(c) relief. Thus, non-LPR aliens would be eligible for § 212(c) relief
so long as they maintained a seven-year lawful domicile prior to
the deportation order. Likewise, a motion to reopen or reconsider the denial of § 212(c) relief should not be barred solely
because the alien does not possess LPR status when making the
motion. Under this approach, Butros would still be allowed to
move to reopen or reconsider the denial of § 212(c) relief because he possessed the requisite seven-year lawful domicile
before being found deportable. 261
1.

The Proposed Solution is Consistent With Matter of Lok II
and the Second Circuit's Approach

Abolishing the requirement that an alien possess present
LPR status to maintain eligibility for § 212(c) is consistent with
Matter of Lok II.262 There, the BIA ruled that an administratively final deportation order terminates LPR status. 263 The BIA
then held Lok to be statutorily ineligible for § 212(c) relief. 264
The Ninth Circuit has since inferred that termination of LPR
status automatically renders an alien statutorily ineligible for
§ 212(c) relief.266
The proposed solution dispels this inference. Rather, it interprets the termination of LPR status as affecting only the calculation of the alien's lawful domicile. Once LPR status is terminated, courts and the BIA must still ask whether the alien
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Butros, 990 F.2d 1142, 1152 (Trott, J., dissenting).
See Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142, 1143 (9th Cir. 1993).
18 I. & N. Dec. 101 (1981).
Id. at 105.
Id. at 110.
See Gonzales u. INS, 921 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1990).
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possessed seven years of lawful domicile. If the alien did not, a
motion to reopen or reconsider would have to be denied not because the alien had lost status as one "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" but because the alien did not possess seven
years of lawful domicile. Simply stated, present LPR status
should not be required to move to reopen or reconsider the denial of § 212(c) relief from deportation.
Such an interpretation is perfectly consistent with the Matter of Lok II holding, as Lok would be barred from reopening or
reconsidering because he possessed less than five years of lawful
domicile at the time his deportation order became administratively fina1. 266 If an alien possessed seven years of lawful domicile at some point prior to administrative finality, however, then
a later motion to reopen or reconsider should be entertained.267
This interpretation is also consistent with the Second Circuit's handling of motions to reopen the denial of § 212(c) relief.268 In Vargas v. INS, the alien's factual setting mirrored that
of Butros.269 Vargas arrived in the U.S. as an LPR when he was
four years old. 270 Sixteen years later, he was convicted of criminal posse'ssion of cocaine.271 At the following deportation proceeding, Vargas conceded deportability but sought § 212(c) relief.272 The immigration judge denied relief and the BIA later
dismissed the appeal. 273 Vargas moved to reopen to present new
evidence, most notably the birth of a child and a following marriage. 274 The BIA denied the motion to reopen under the belief
that Matter of Lok II was controlling. The BIA reasoned that
Vargas lost LPR status at' the time his initial appeal was dismissed, that LPR status was necessary for § 212(c) eligibility,
and that Vargas was thus statutorily ineligible for § 212(c)
relief. 27C1
266. See Matter of Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 104.
267. The alien will still have to meet a heavy burden in proving that reopening or
reconsideration is warranted. See Matter of Coelho, Int. Dec. 3172 (BIA Apr 30, 1992).
268. See Vargas v. INS, 938 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1991).
269. See supra notes 16-31 and accompanying text for Butros' facts.
270. Vargas, 938 F.2d at 359.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 359-60.
274. Id. at 360.
275. See id. (citing Matter of Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. 101).
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The Second Circuit, on appeal, distinguished Matter of Lok
II.276 The Vargas court recognized that in Matter of Lok II, "the
BIA denied the application of a permanent resident alien for
Section 212(c) relief because the alien had failed to accrue the
required seven years of 'lawful unrelinquished domicile' and
was therefore statutorily ineligible."277 The Vargas court noted
that "for purposes of calculating the seven-year requirement,
Lok's status as a permanent resident ended when he failed to
appeal the Immigration Judge's finding of deportability."278 The
Second Circuit read Matter of Lok II to stand "only for the proposition that an alien cannot become eligible for discretionary
relief through subsequent accrual of time towards the seven-year
threshold, once he has conceded that he is deportable."279 The
Second Circuit believed that if the alien was eligible for relief
before conceding deportability, then a later finding of deportability would not divest such eligibility.280
2.

The Proposed Solution Should Be Followed Until Congress
or the United States Supreme Court Acts With Respect to
Section-212(c)-Type Relief From Deportation

The panoply of § 212(c) interpretations quite obviously
stems from good-faith judicial and administrative efforts to apply § 212(c) to proceedings the statute was never designed to
affect.281 As additional circuit courts address the issue, the potential for even further misapplication increases. Although the
BIA and the circuit courts employ good-faith efforts to abide by
the statutory purpose of § 212(c), the result has been a conglomeration of opposing and tangential views. Since the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Butros v. INS,282 the Third and Fourth Cir276. Vargas, 938 F.2d at 360 ("Matter of Lok (Ill, however, is not an adequate basis
for the BIA's position."); id. at 361 ("[tlhe concern which motivated the creation of the
rule in Matter of Lok (Ill-preventing an alien from manipulating deportability proceedings so as to acquire the seven years of domicile-is not present here.").
277. [d. at 360-61 (emphasis added).
278. [d. (emphasis added).
279. [d.
280. See id.
281. See Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993); Vargas v. INS, 938 F.2d 358
(2d Cir. 1991); Gonzales v. INS, 921 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1990); Marti-Xiques v. INS, 741
F.2d 350 (11th Cir. 1984); Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976); Matter of Lok II,
18 I. & N. Dec. 101 (1981); Matter of G.A., 7 I. & N. Dec. 274 (1956); Matter of S., 6 I. &
N. 392 (1954); Matter of L., 1 I. & N. Dec. 1 (1940) .
282. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993).
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cuits have criticized the Ninth Circuit's position in favor of the
BIA's position. 283 The First and Seventh Circuits, however, have
chosen rules similar in effect to the Butros rule. 284
The answer, apparently, lies not in judicial or administrative statutory construction but in new legislation which will assemble the sensible rules into a statute directly addressing deportation proceedings. Such a statute will prevent the courts
from delving into the statutory purpose of § 212(c)-a process
which, considering that the legislative discussion regarding
§ 212(c) did not anticipate its application to deportable aliens,
is really little more than a farce. Barring the ehactment of legislation, only the United States Supreme Court can universally
clarify the rules. 281i Until then, the circuit courts, as well as the
BIA, would be wise to allow deportable aliens to move to reopen
their cases so long as they had maintained a lawful domicile for
the requisite seven years at some point prior to an administratively final deportation order.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Butros v. INS,286 the Ninth Circuit ruled that a deportation order is not final if the decision can be appealed or if the
BIA can reopen or reconsider the case.287 Nairn Butros was thus
able to continue seeking § 212(c) relief. In its ruling the Ninth
Circuit focused on the deportation order's finality and extended
the point at which LPR status terminates. The Ninth Circuit
could have achieved the same fair result by simply abolishing
the present LPR status requirement for aliens seeking § 212(c)
relief from deportation. Such a ruling would have streamlined
the immigration laws. rather than unduly complicating matters.
283. See Katsis v. INS, 997 F.2d 1067, 1075-76 (3d Cir. 1993); Nwolise v. INS, 4
F.3d 306 (4th Cir. 1993).
284. See Goncalves v. INS, 6 F.3d 830 (1st Cir. 1993); Henry v. INS, 8 F.3d 426 (7th
Cir. 1993).
285. Although the circuits are splitting, the U.S. Supreme Court has been reluctant
to take cases in this area of the law. See, e.g., Nwolise, 4 F.3d 306, cert. denied, 127 L.
Ed. 2d 82 (1994); Katsis, 997 F.2d 1067, cert. denied, 127 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1994); Ghassan v.
INS, 972 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1412 (1993);
Chiravacharadhikul v. INS, 645 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893
(1981).
286. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993).
287. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1145.
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Until Congress enacts legislation directly providing § 212(c)
type relief from deportation, or until the United States Supreme
Court rules on the issue, this proposal is the most sensible construction of § 212(c).
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